Agricultural production with uncertain water supply by Dagsvik, John K. & Mathiassen, Astrid
Discussion Papers No. 370, March 2004 
Statistics Norway, Research Department  
 
John K. Dagsvik and Astrid L. 
Mathiassen 
Agricultural Production with 
Uncertain Water Supply 
Abstract: 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework for analysis of multioutput agricultural 
production when the supply of water is uncertain. Specifically, we assume that the farmer 
operates as if the decision process takes place in two stages. In stage one the farmer 
decides how much land to allocate to each crop. However, in this stage he is uncertain 
about the supply of water during the growth period before harvest. In the second stage when 
the uncertainty is revealed he adjusts the quantities of (ex-post) input factors (given the 
allocation in the first stage). The production technology is assumed to be of the Leontief 
type. We also extend the model to the case with several seasons where one crop is 
cultivated throughout all season while the remaining crops are seasonal-specific. The 
empirical model is extended to allow for a particular version of bounded rationality in which 
the farmer is allowed to make optimization error. This implies that the estimation procedure 
is considerably simplified. 
Keywords: Multioutput agricultural production, Uncertain water supply, Land constraints, 
Continuous random utility model, Leontief technology. 
JEL classification: D21, N50 
Acknowledgement: We thank Karl O. Moene and Steinar Strøm for valuable comments. 
Address: John K. Dagsvik, Statistics Norway, Research Department.  
E-mail: john.dagsvik@ssb.no 
 
 
Discussion Papers comprise research papers intended for international journals or books. As a pre-
print a Discussion Paper can be longer and more elaborate than a standard jour-
nal article by including intermediate calculation and background material etc. 
 
 
 
 
Abstracts with downloadable PDF files of  
Discussion Papers are available on the Internet: http://www.ssb.no 
 
 
For printed Discussion Papers contact: 
 
Statistics Norway 
Sales- and subscription service  
N-2225 Kongsvinger 
 
Telephone: +47 62 88 55 00 
Telefax: +47 62 88 55 95 
E-mail:  Salg-abonnement@ssb.no 
 3
1. Introduction 
In this paper we develop a modeling framework for analyzing multicrop agricultural production in the 
presence of uncertainty with respect to supply of water with land as a fixed factor. Specifically, we 
consider a situation where the decisions of the production process of the farmer can be viewed as a 
two stage process as follows: In stage one he allocates the appropriate land areas-and other (ex-ante) 
input factors to the respective crops he plans to cultivate, within the total farmland available to him. 
This allocation must be carried out before it is revealed how much water is available to him, since he 
needs to plant and distribute seeds in the beginning of the respective seasons. In the second stage the 
uncertainty about water supply is revealed and the farmer adjusts the quantities of the ex-post input 
factors including the allocation of water to the respective cropland areas. Typical ex-post input factors 
(in addition to water) are pesticides, labor for treshing, etc. The farmer is risk neutral and the 
production technology is of the Leontief type. Our motivation for this assumption is the fact that in 
agricultural production there are typically limited possibilities for substitution among key (crop 
specific) production factors. In particular, the amount of water needed for a given land area and a 
given crop is approximately fixed. 
 In the literature on economic analysis of agricultural production a number of studies have 
considered the issue of modeling multicrop production. Often a production function based on 
aggregated farm inputs (aggregated across crops) is applied. This is motivated by the fact that data on 
crop-specific inputs are often not available, see for example Chambers and Just (1989). Just, 
Silberman and Hockman (1983), and Just et al. (1990) discuss whether separability or nonjointness is 
a better approach for attaining tractability for multicrop production function estimation. Shumway, 
Pope and Nash (1984), and Chambers and Just (1989)) discuss the implication for the modeling 
approach when jointness is a consequence of a fixed but allocable input factor such as land. Moore, 
Gollehon and Carey (1994a) discuss alternative models of input allocations of multicrop systems, and 
Moore, Gollehon and Carey (1994b) have conducted an empirical analysis on multicrop irrigated 
production under the assumption of nonjointness and land constraints with particular focus on the role 
of water pricing. Moore and Dinar (1995), discuss the case when water is quantity rationed, either due 
to subsidized pricing or institutional regulations on water supply and they treat water as a fixed rather 
than a variable input factor. Ballivian and Sickles (1994), analyze the relationship between risk-
avoidance behavior and economic jointness in a multioutput agricultural technology. They treat 
production uncertainty as unobserved stochastic error that is common to all farms in specific regions. 
 The difference between our approach and the ones referred to above is as follows: We 
formulate an explicit model in which the farmer's uncertainty with respect to water supply, rationing of 
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land and the possibility of corner solutions are accounted for. None of the papers referred to above 
allow for all these aspects in one and the same model. Furthermore, we demonstrate how an empirical 
version of the model can be estimated from appropriate micro data.  
 An additional aspect that separates this paper from the mainstream approach to this type of 
modeling challenges is that we propose a particular form of bounded rationality. This means that we 
allow for optimization error. The motivation for this is two-fold. First, it is the acknowledgement that 
the farmer may have difficulty with evaluating expected profit conditional on the allocation of land 
areas to each crop. Furthermore, he may, due to limited computational capacities, not be able to (or 
care to) even consider evaluating expected utility conditional at all feasible combinations of cropland 
allocations. Second, this approach is very useful for practical empirical analysis because it yields a 
convenient representation for the probability distribution of the chosen allocation of cropland. By 
adapting a result of Dagsvik (1994) we demonstrate that one can obtain convenient expressions for the 
joint probability density for the chosen allocation of cropland areas. This choice probability density 
reflects the inherent randomness in the decision making process. This randomness, due to optimization 
error, implies that the farmer may make different ex ante allocation decisions under identical 
conditions.  
 The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we specify the setting and production 
technology and in Section 3 we derive the conditional expected profit function given the respective 
areas that are allocated to each crop for the case with two feasible crops and we derive some 
implications from the model. In Section 4 we extend this analysis to the general case with several 
feasible crops. In the appendix we consider briefly a particular case with more than one season. In 
tropical environments a year normally consists of three seasons; monsoon, winter and summer. We 
take into account that some crops (such as sugarcane) needs more that one season to grow, while most 
crops ripen within one season. In Section 5 we discuss the application of our approach to bounded 
rationality with particular focus on empirical modeling and estimation. This yields a convenient 
representation for the probability distribution of the chosen allocation of cropland. As a result, the 
estimation method based on the bounded rationality approach represents an enormous simplification of 
the estimation procedure. 
2. The modeling setting 
The model we develop below applies to the dry season, where water is assumed to be distributed 
through an irrigation system. In this farming context the farmer’s decision process takes place in two 
stages. In stage one he decides how much land to allocate to each crop. In this stage he is uncertain 
about how much water he will receive during the season. In the second stage he receives the water and 
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allocation of water takes place. We assume that the farmer’s production technology is Leontief. Since 
there is no scope for substitution between land and water, it follows that the profit maximizing farmer 
distributes water to the different crops in a hierarchical manner. First, he allocates the appropriate 
amount of water (if available) to the crop with the highest marginal returns (crop 1). If some water is 
left it is distributed in an appropriate amount to the crop with the second highest marginal returns 
(crop 2). If there still is some water left it is distributed to the crop with the third highest marginal 
returns (crop 3), and so on, until there is no water left or his entire field is irrigated. In the first stage, 
when the agent allocates the cropland areas, we assume that he takes into account the second stage 
regime of water allocation. It is also assumed that some of the input factors are chosen in the second 
stage when the uncertainty about water supply is revealed. The uncertainty the farmer faces is due to 
several factors. One important source of uncertainty stems from the fact that the weather is stochastic. 
In many regions it typically rains heavily during a relatively short period of time and water is therefore 
collected in regional reservoirs or in private wells. These reservoirs are exposed to evaporation and 
percolation losses. Further sources of uncertainty about the water supply are related to possible corrupt 
behavior among reservoir administrators, farmers that may illegally tap water, and irregularity in the 
supply of water dependent on the location of the farm relative to the reservoirs. As a result, the farmer 
does not know exactly how much water is available to him during the growth period until harvest. The 
farmer is supposed to have information about the degree of uncertainty of the water supply in the 
second stage, and is capable of representing this information by a probability distribution function. 
The production technology parameters may possibly also be uncertain to the farmer, but we shall 
assume here that the farmer ignores this type of uncertainty.  
 We assume that there is, conditional on farm production equipment, no production of scope 
effect. Let xrj denote quantity of input factor r associated with output of type j, r s, s 1,...,q= − − + . We 
shall let x0j represent area of land and x1j represents quantity of water that affects output of type j 
(sugarcane, maize, rice, etc.). Let xrj, with r 1≤  represent inputs of factors associated with the first 
stage allocation, such as seeds, etc. Thus, the variables { }rjx , r s, s 1,...,1∈ − − +  represent inputs of 
factors, associated with the first stage allocation, while r 2,...,q= , represent second stage input factors 
such as water, labor, etc.  
 The Leontief production technology implies that output yj of type j is given by 
(2.1) ( )j rj rj rj
s r q
y min b x , b 0
− ≤ ≤
= >  
where brj is the marginal productivity of input factor r for production of crop j. 
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 We mainly consider the case where agricultural production takes place in only one season. In 
the appendix we outline how one could allow for several seasons where the cultivation of some crops 
may extend over several seasons. 
3. The case with two feasible crops 
In this section we shall derive the conditional expected profit function given the respective inputs of 
cropland, and we shall subsequently discuss some implications of this function. 
 For simplicity we start the analysis by considering the case with only two possible crops. 
Recall that the farmer’s decision process takes place in two stages. In the first stage the area of 
cropland is allocated by maximizing expected profit with respect to cropland areas, as will now be 
explained. Let ( )π x% denote the conditional profit function given the respective quantities of input, i.e. 
(3.1) ( )
q2
j rj rj rj rj
r
j 1 r s
( ) p min b x w x
= =−
 
π = − 
  
∑ ∑x%  
where ( )s1 s 1,1 01 11 21 02 12 q2x ,x ,..., x ,x ,x ,..., x , x ,..., x− − +=x , pj is the output price of crop j, and wrj is the 
price of input r of crop j. Prices and technology parameters are assumed known with perfect certainty 
to the farmer. 
 The constraints are given by 
(3.2) 
01 02
x x a+ ≤  
and 
(3.3) 
11 12
x x V+ ≤  
where a is the area of the land available for crop cultivation and V is the total amount of water. V is a 
random variable with c.d.f. ( )F v , v 0≥ . The distribution F is the subjective distribution specific to the 
farmer. Thus, this setup means that we assume that the farmer is capable of representing his 
uncertainty about water supply by a probability distribution.  
 Assuming risk neutrality, the agent maximizes the conditional expected profit (given the 
allocation of water to the crops) with respect to land allocation. Due to the Leontief technology (2.1) 
the demands satisfy the equations 
(3.4) 
0 j 0 j
rj
rj
b x
x , r s,..., 1,
b
= = − −   and  
1j 1j
rj
rj
b x
x , r 2,..,q.
b
= =  
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Hence, allocation of land determines input of ex-ante input factors. Allocation of water determines use 
of ex-post input factors. Assume now that the farmer pays for water according to how much he plants. 
This is realistic if the farmer gets water from a surface system, because there are usually no volumetric 
measures installed
1
. Thus, expected profit conditional on ( )01 02x ,x  equals 
(3.5) 
( ) ( )
( )
q2 1
*
01 02 j 0 j 0 j 1j 1j rj rj rj rj
j 1 r 1 r s
2 1
rj
j 1j j 0 j 1j 1j 1j rj rj
rjj 1 r 1 r s
x ,x p Emin b x ,b x w Ex w x
w
p b Emin c x ,x b Ex x w
b
= > =−
= > =−
 
π = − −  
 
 
= − −  
 
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 
where j 0 j 1jc b b= . The interpretation of cj is the required amount of water per unit land (cubic meter 
per hectare). If cropland area no. one is the principal cropland we have that 
(3.6) ( ) ( )( )11 1 12 2 1x min z ,V and x min z , V z ,+= = −  
where X+ means ( )max 0,X  and j j 0 jz c x , j 1,2= = . We shall call z1 and z2 the respective water 
equivalents. 
 We can now prove the following result: 
 
 Proposition 1 
 Let Mj be defined by 
 (3.7)  
>
= − ∑
q
rj
j j 1 j 1 j
rjr 1
w
M p b b
b
, 
 and assume that M1 > M2.. The conditional profit function π(z1, z2) given the input of water 
equivalents, ( )1 2z ,z , equals 
(3.8) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
+
 
≡ = + − − − 
 
* 1 2
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2
1 2
z z
z ,z , M Emin z ,V M Emin z , V z h z h z
c c
π π , 
where 
                                                     
1 If in contrast, irrigation depends on groundwater from own well it is more realistic that the farmer pays for the water he 
actually uses. In this case the cost of water is the cost of operating the pump of the well. The analysis of this case is 
completely similar to the case above and will not be discussed here. 
 8
(3.9) 
≤
= ∑
rj
j 1 j
rjr 1
w
h b
b
. 
 
The conditional profit function, ( )1 2z ,zπ , can be expressed as 
(3.10) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )= − + + − −1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2z ,z M M G z M G z z h z h zπ  
where 
(3.11) ( ) ( ) ( )( )≡ = −∫
z
0
G z Emin z,V 1 F v dv . 
 
 Since in the second stage supply of water will be the limiting factor it is convenient to 
express values in terms of returns per unit of water. Clearly, Mj  is the operating ex-post marginal 
return per unit of water used, hj is ex ante investment costs, also measured per unit of water. Thus, the 
first bracket in (3.8) yields the expected profit of crop one, viewed from the beginning of stage one 
and the second bracket yields the same for crop two. Eq. (3.8) follows directly from (3.5) and (3.6). 
Recall that it follows from the model, and it is also intuitive, that it is most profitable to first irrigate 
the crop with the highest marginal profit per unit water.  
 Note that when the amount of water ( )V v,v dv∈ + , 1v z ,<  then ( )1Emin V,z v= . The 
probability of this is f (v)dv . When ( )1 1 1V z , Emin V,z z> = . The probability that this will happen is 
( )11 F z− . Summing up we obtain that 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
z z
1 1 1 1
0 0
Emin V,z vf (v)dv z 1 F z 1 F(v) dv G z= + − = − =∫ ∫  
where G is defined in (3.11). The last equation follows from integrating by parts. Similarly we obtain 
that 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
1 1
z z z z
2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
z z
Emin z , V z v z f (v)dv z 1 F z z 1 F(v) dv G z z G z
+ +
+
− = − + − + = − = + −∫ ∫ . 
 The farmer’s planning problem is to allocate land to the two crops in stage one so that 
expected profit is maximized when total available land is given. That is, the problem is to maximize 
π(z1, z2) given by (3.10), subject to 1z 0≥ , 2z 0≥ , and 
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(3.12) 1 2
1 2
z z
a
c c
+ ≤ . 
As seen from (3.10), the function G plays a crucial role here. G(z) is the truncated mean supply of 
water below the truncation threshold z. G(z) can be interpreted as the expected “capacity utilization” 
given the cropland area z. 
 By applying definition 12.6 in Berck and Sydsæter (1993) it follows readily that ( )1 2z ,zπ  is 
strictly concave when 
1 2
M M> . It follows that the first order conditions that correspond to the 
maximization problem above are given by 
(3.13) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
1 1
z ,z
M M F z M F z z h
z c
∗ ∗ ∗
∂π λ
= − + + − = −µ
∂
 
and 
(3.14) 
( )
( )1 2 * *2 1 2 2 2
2 2
z ,z
M F z z h
z c
∂π λ
= + − = −µ
∂
 
where F(z) 1 F(z)≡ −  and *
1
z  and 
*
2
z  denote the respective values at which optimum is achieved and λ 
and 
1 2
,µ µ  are Lagrange multipliers. The multiplier λ is positive when all available cropland is used 
and zero otherwise, while µ1 and µ2 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with non-negative water 
usage. That is, µ1 is positive when 
*
1
z 0= , and µ2 is positive when 
*
2
z 0= . Otherwise, µ1 and µ2 are 
equal to zero. The interpretation of ( )*1F z  and ( )*2F z  is as the probability of receiving enough water 
to cultivate *
1
z  and 
*
2
z , respectively.  
 There are three special cases of interest which we shall analyze next.  
 
Case (i): * *
1 2
z 0, z 0= > . 
For this case to be true, we see from (3.13) and (3.14) that we must have that 
1
0µ ≥  and 
2
0µ = , so 
that  
(3.15) 
( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2z 0 z 0
z ,z z ,z
c c
z z
= =
∂π ∂π
≤
∂ ∂
. 
Thus, viewed from the planning stage (stage one), no land should be allocated to crop one if the 
marginal expected profit of allocating land to crop one evaluated at zero land for crop one, is less than 
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or equal to the marginal expected profit of allocating land to crop two, evaluated at zero land for crop 
one. From (3.14) we see that when *
1
z 0= , 
 ( )*2 2 2
2
M F z h 0
c
λ
− = ≥  
where 0λ >  corresponds to the case where all the land is cultivated, i.e., *
2 2
z a c= . If ( )2 2 2M F ac h< , 
then it is not optimal to use all the land and *
2
z  is in this case determined by 
 * 1 2
2
2
h
z F
M
−
 
=  
 
. 
In general, we can express *
2
z  as 
 * 1 2
2 2
2
h
z min a c ,F
M
−
  
=    
  
. 
 
Case (ii): * *
1 2
z 0, z 0> = . 
For this case to be true we must have that 
1
0µ =  and 
2
0µ ≥  in (3.13) and (3.14), and we thus get 
(3.16) 
( ) ( )
2 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2z 0 z 0
z ,z z ,z
c c
z z
= =
∂π ∂π
≥
∂ ∂
. 
If marginal expected profit of allocating land to crop two, evaluated at zero land for crop two, is less 
than or equal to the marginal expected profit of allocating land to crop one, evaluated at zero land for 
crop two, then *
2
z 0= . 
 Similarly to case (i) the land constraint (3.12) is not binding when ( )1 1 1M F ac h 0− < , so that 
*
1
z  can be expressed as 
 * 1 1
1 1
1
h
z min a c ,F
M
−
  
=    
  
. 
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Case (iii): * *
1 2
z 0, z 0> > . 
This case will occur if the inequalities in both (3.15) and (3.16) are reversed, in which case *
1
z  and *
2
z  
are determined by 
(3.17) 
( ) ( )1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2
z ,z z ,z
c c
z z
∂π ∂π
=
∂ ∂
. 
Eq. (3.17) states that optimal allocation of land, as viewed from stage one, follows from equating 
marginal expected profit. If sufficient water is received in stage two then all land will be used and 
allocation must fulfill the land constraint (3.12). 
 However, if 
(3.18) 1 2 2 1 2
1 2 2 1 2
h h h h h
1 and
M M M M M
− −
< <
− −
 
then not all land will be used and 
 * 1 * * 11 2 2
1 1 2
1 2 2
h h h
z F , z z F
M M M
− −
   −
= + =   
−   
 
provided these allocations yield 
 
* *
1 2
1 2
z z
a
c c
+ < . 
Note that the conditions in (3.18) are equivalent to 
 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
h h
M M h h and
M M
− > − > . 
 The next proposition summarizes the discussion above. 
 
 Proposition 2 
 Assume that =n 2 , >
1 2
M M , and ≥ =
j j
M h , j 1,2 . Assume also that the interval 
( )  1 20,max ac ,ac  is included in the support of F. 
(i) If 
(3.19)  ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )
+ +
− ≥ − − − − −
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
c M F ac h c M h M h M F ac h  
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then =*
1
z 0  and >*
2
z 0 . In particular, if (3.19) holds with ( ) ≥2 2 2M F ac h  then =
*
2 2
z ac . Otherwise, 
if (3.19) holds with ( ) <2 2 2M F ac h  then 
−
 
= < 
 
* 1 2
2 2
2
h
z F ac
M
. 
(ii) If 
(3.20) ( )( ) ( )( )
+
− ≥ −
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2
c M F ac h c M F ac h  
then *
1
z 0>  and *
2
z 0= . In particular, if (3.20) holds with ( )1 1 1M F ac h≥ , then =
*
1 1
z ac . Otherwise, 
if (3.20) holds with ( ) <1 1 1M F ac h , then 
−
 
= < 
 
* 1 1
1 1
1
h
z F ac
M
. 
(iii) If 
(3.21)   ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )
+ +
− ≤ − < − − − − −
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
c M F ac h c M F ac h c M h M h M F ac h  
then >*
1
z 0  and >*
2
z 0 . 
 If 
(3.22) > − > − >1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
h h
,M M h h 0
M M
 
and 
(3.23) − −
    −
− + <    
−    
1 11 2 2
1 2 1 2 2 2
h h h1 1 1
F F a
M M c c M c
 
then not all the land is used and 
 − −
   −
= > = − >   
−   
* 1 * 1 *1 2 2
1 2 1
1 2 2
h h h
z F 0 and z F z 0
M M M
. 
 
When interpreting the results in Proposition 2 it is important to recall that since crop 1 has highest ex-
post marginal profit per unit water, the farmer will always supply water to this crop first. If for 
example, he considers to reduce production of crop two in order to start up production of crop one, he 
must take into account in the planning that crop 1 gets the necessary amount of water first (in the 
second stage). Since the crops have decreasing marginal expected returns, the farmer will never 
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produce crop 1 if the marginal expected profit with respect to crop 1, evaluated at zero land use for 
crop 1 and total land use for crop 2, is less that the marginal expected profit with respect to crop 2, 
evaluated at zero land use for crop one and total land use for crop two. This is expressed in (3.19). 
Note that due to uncertainty about water supply the marginal expected profit with respect to crop one, 
expressed on the right hand side of (3.19), equals the corresponding marginal profit minus a correction 
term that represents marginal expected “loss” due to the fact that crop two does not receive the “first 
drop of water”. Similarly, in case (ii) the farmer will never produce crop two if the marginal expected 
profit with respect to crop two, evaluated at zero land use for crop two and total land use for crop one 
is less than the marginal expected profit with respect to crop one, evaluated at zero land use for crop 
two and total land use for crop one. In the in-between cases the farmer will produce both crops. Case 
(iii) summarizes the situation when it is optimal to produce both crops. Unfortunately, a closed form 
expression for *
1
z  and *
2
z  in case (iii) can in general not be found.  
 The allocation of land depends on the uncertainty related to distribution function, F, and the 
relation between ex-post profit and investments costs for the crops. Case (i) of Proposition 2 illustrates 
that even if ex-post marginal profit per unit water is lowest for crop two, i.e. 
1 1 2 2
M h M h− > − , the 
farmer can still choose only to produce crop two. This can be the case when crop two is the most 
“water intensive” crop, i.e., c2/c1 is sufficiently high and the land constraint is effective (supply of 
water is high). This result is consistent with part (ii) of Proposition 3 (perfect certainty), stated below. 
The planting costs affect the risk of producing the respective crops. For example, in case (i) not all 
land will be used if h2 is so high that the probability of receiving enough water is less than 2 2h M , 
i.e., 
 ( ) ( ) 22 2
2
h
P V ac F ac
M
> = < . 
In case (ii) the same situation occurs if 
 ( ) ( ) 11 1
1
h
P V ac F ac
M
> = < . 
In case (iii) the situation is a bit more complicated. Consider now 
 1 11 2 2
1 2 2
h h h
F and F
M M M
− −
   −
   
−   
 
as a function of 
1 2
h h−  and h2, respectively. Since these functions are decreasing in 1 2h h−  and h2, 
respectively, it will be the case that the inequality in (3.23) will be true for sufficiently high 
1 2
h h−  
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and h2 when 1 2c c< . Thus, there is increasing risk when h2 increases and h1 increases faster than h2. 
However, when 
1 2
c c>  the left hand side of (3.23) is decreasing in h2 and increasing in 1 2h h− . Thus, 
in this case there is increasing risk when h2 increases and h1 does not increase as fast as h2. In this case 
crop one is the most profitable if sufficient water is supplied. Thus, even a risk neutral farmer may 
grow both crops when uncertainty about water supply is high. 
 The next result concerns the special case in which the farmer is assumed to have perfect 
certainty. Note that only part (ii) of Proposition 3 stated below is a special case of Proposition 2. 
 
 Proposition 3 
 Assume that = >
1 2
n 2,M M  and > =j jM h , j 1,2 . Assume furthermore that the farmer 
knows the supply of water with perfect certainty.  
 
(i) If  ( )< 1 2V min ac ,ac   and  − < − ≠ =j j k kM h M h , j k , j, k 1,2,  
 then  =*jz 0   and  =
*
k
z V . 
 
(ii) If  ( )≥ 1 2V max ac ,ac   and  ( ) ( )− < − ≠ =j j j k k kc M h c M h , j k , j,k 1,2,  
 then  =*jz 0   and  =
*
k kz ac . 
 
(iii) If  < <j kac V ac   and  − < − ≠ =j j k kM h M h , j k , j, k 1,2,  
 then  =*jz 0   and  =
*
k
z V . 
 
(iv) If  < <j kac V ac   and  ( ) ( )− > − ≠ =j j j k k kc M h c M h , j k , j, k 1,2,  
 then  =*j jz ac   and  =
*
kz 0 . 
 
(v) If  < <j kac V ac , ( ) ( )− > − < ≠ =j j j k k k j kc M h c M h and c c , j k , j, k 1,2 , 
 then  =*j jz ac   and  = −
*
k jz V ac . 
 
 The result in (i) of Proposition 3 states that when the land constraint is not binding the farmer 
will only produce the crop with the highest marginal profit per unit water. In case (ii) the profit from 
producing crop j only is ( )j j ja c M h− . Thus, it will be most profitable to produce solely crop j if crop 
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j has the highest marginal profit per unit land. Case (iii) is similar to case (i) and case (iv) is similar to 
case (ii). In case (v) we realize that the conditions imply that the low water intensive crop has the 
highest marginal profit per unit water. Thus, both crops will be produced when the following 
conditions are fulfilled: The low water intensive crop has highest marginal profit per unit water, 
supply of water is higher than the requirement to grow this crop on the entire farm, and marginal profit 
per unit land from the high water intensive crop is higher than for the low water intensive crop.  
4. The general case with more than two feasible crops 
With the same notation as above we get in this case that 
(4.1)    ( ) ( ) ( )( )
n 1 n
1 1 2 2 1 n n j j j
j 1 j 1
M Emin z ,V M Emin z , V z ... M Emin z , V z h z .
−
+
= =
+
  
 π = + − + + − − 
    
∑ ∑z  
where ( )1 2 nz ,z ,..., z=z , and j 0 j jz x c= . Similarly to the analysis above we obtain 
(4.2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1 2 1 2 3 1 2
n 1 n n
n 1 n j n j j j
j 1 j 1 j 1
M M G z M M G z z
... M M G z M G z h z
−
−
= = =
π = − + − +
   
+ + − + −   
   
   
∑ ∑ ∑
z
 
with budget constraint 
(4.3) 
n
j
jj 1
z
a
c
=
≤∑ . 
Now assume that 
1 2
M M ... 0> > > . The conditional profit function is strictly concave in this case and 
the first order conditions are given by 
(4.4) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
n
* * * *
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 n j 1 1
1j 1
M M F z M M F z z ... M F z h
c
=
  λ
− + − + + + = + −µ  
 
∑ , 
(4.5) ( ) ( )
n
* * *
2 3 1 2 n j 2 2
2j 1
M M F z z ... M F z h
c
=
  λ
− + + + = + −µ  
 
∑ , 
(4.6) ( ) ( )
n
* * * *
3 4 1 2 3 n j 3 3
3j 1
M M F z z z ... M F z h
c
=
  λ
− + + + + = + −µ  
 
∑ , 
 16
…., etc., and 
(4.7) 
n
n k n n
nk 1
M F z h
c
∗
=
  λ
= + −µ 
 
∑  
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (4.3) and µj is positive when 0=
∗
j
z , 
and zero otherwise. 
 It is possible to derive similar results as in Proposition 2 from the first order conditions (4.4) 
and (4.7). We shall, however, leave this for another occasion. 
5. Allowing for bounded rationality 
The modeling approach discussed above is based on the assumption that the farmer is able to evaluate 
perfectly the expected profit conditional on a given allocation of land to each crop. However, many 
studies as well as laboratory experiments seem to indicate that people are boundedly rational in the 
sense that when a decision-maker faces replications of the same choice experiment, he may make 
different choices in different replications. In our case it seems reasonable that there may be a 
considerable degree of bounded rationality. The reason for this is that the farmer does not have a 
precise knowledge of the distribution of the supply of water. Even if he did, he may not be able to 
solve the type of optimization problem we have discussed above (given F, { }jM , { }jh  and { }jc ). As 
we shall discuss in the next section our particular approach to bounded rationality leads to a practical 
maximum likelihood method that can conveniently be applied to a sample of micro data.  
 Consider for simplicity the model with 2 possible crops. Let 
(5.1) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2U z ,z z ,z z ,z≡ π + ε  
where ( )1 2z ,zπ  is given by (3.10) and ( )1 2z ,zε  is a stochastic error term (taste-shifter), and assume 
now that the farmer maximizes ( )1 2U z ,z  rather than maximizing ( )1 2z ,zπ  (subject to the land 
constraint (3.12)). As mentioned above, one important contribution to the error term stem from the 
farmer’s inability to assess the correct objective distribution of the water supply. Specifically, let Gi(z) 
denote the subjective function farmer i applies instead of the objective function, ( )G(z) Emin z,V= . 
In general, Gi(z) may differ from G(z). Thus the error term ( )1 2z ,zε  may be interpreted as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 2 1 2 i 1 1 2 i 1 2 1 2 1 2z ,z M M G z G z M G z z G z z z ,zε = − − + + − + + η  
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where the first two terms are due to possible deviation of the subjective functions { }iG  (based on the 
distribution of water supply) from the objective G function and the term ( )1 2z ,zη  is due to 
optimization error. For farmer i one may have, as a special case, that the two first terms do not vary 
from one “experiment” to another, that is from one year to another. In this special case the two first 
terms represent in fact “pure” unobserved heterogeneity. We assume that the farmer is perfectly 
certain about the values { }jM , which he uses to determine the priority rank ordering of the crops with 
respect to the distribution of water. Let d be the lowest level of land use observed in the data. In 
addition, we shall also assume that the farmer is boundedly rational in the sense that he does not 
consider all possible allocation combinations within the set Ω given by 
(5.2) ( ) 1 21 2 1 2
1 2
z z
z ,z : d a, z 0, z 0
c c
 
Ω ≡ ≤ + ≤ ≥ ≥ 
 
, 
but rather considers only a subset Ωˆ  of Ω. The subset Ωˆ  is random in the sense that its points are 
generated by a probability mechanism. This probability mechanism is such that the points in Ωˆ  are 
dispersed randomly. The intuition is that the subset of alternatives the agent actually takes into 
consideration may vary across identical choice experiments due to psychological processes that are not 
fully understoodor can be controlled by him. This type of approach has been investigated by 
Dagsvik (1994). We shall now outline the version of Dagsvik’s approach. Let { }kˆ ˆ,k 1,2,...= ≡ ΩZ , be 
an enumeration of the points in Ωˆ , where ( )k 1k 2kˆ ˆ ˆZ ,Z=Z . For simplicity write ( )k kˆεˆ ≡ ε Z . One 
convenient way of representing random sets consisting of independently scattered points is to apply 
the formalism of the multidimensional Poisson process. We shall therefore assume that the points 
( ){ }k kˆ ˆ, , k 1,2,...ε =Z  are distributed according to a nonhomogeneous Poisson process on RΩ×  with 
intensity (z) ( )µ θ ε , where µ(z) and θ(z) are positive functions defined on Ω and R, respectively. This 
means that the points ( ){ }k kˆ ˆ, , k 1,2,...ε =Z  are independently scattered across RΩ× , and that the 
“coordinates” { }kZˆ  and { }kεˆ  are independent. The intensity representation given above means that 
the probability that there is a point ( )k kˆ ˆ,εZ  of the process for which ( )kˆ , d∈ +Z z z z  and 
( )kˆ , dε ∈ ε ε + ε  equals ( ) ( )d dµ θ ε εz z . Moreover, the probability that more than one point of the 
process lies within ( ) ( ), d , d+ × ε ε + εz z z  is negligible. To gain more insight in the properties of the 
 18
multidimensional (inhomogeneous) Poisson process, let C be a subset of RΩ×  and N(C)  the number 
of Poisson points located within C. Then the expected number of points within C equals 
(5.3) 
C
EN(C) ( ) ( )d d= µ θ ε ε∫ z z , 
and the probability that there are exactly n points within C is Poisson distributed with parameter 
EN(C) , that is, it is given by 
(5.4) ( ) ( )
( )
n
EN(C)
P N(C) n exp EN(C)
n!
= = − . 
Recall that in our context the probability mechanism is meant to account for the heterogeneity in 
behavior across farmers, and also for one farmer across seemingly identical “choice experiments”. For 
example, if we focus on fluctuations in behavior of one farmer due to bounded rationality, the 
“empirical” counterpart to the probability density in (5.4) is the fraction of times, in a large number of 
replications of a choice experiment, the farmers pick n points within C, where each point consists of a 
combination of a potential allocation ( )kZˆ  and the associated taste-shifters, ( )kεˆ . If population 
heterogeneity has been properly controlled for, heterogeneity across farmers will be indistinguishable 
from heterogeneity across time for a given farmer. 
 Assume furthermore that the farmers behavior satisfies the Independence from Irrelevant 
Alternatives assumption (IIA). We can express this formally as follows. Let A ⊂Ω . Then 
(5.5) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
k k
j k k k j kˆ ˆk kA A
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆP U maxU maxU maxU P U maxU
∈ ∈
   = = = =  
  Z Z
Z Z Z Z Z Z  
for j
ˆ A∈Z . The condition stated in (5.5) means the following: The left hand side expresses the 
probability that jZˆ  is the preferred allocation within Ωˆ , given that the preferred allocation lies within 
the subset ˆA∩Ω . The right hand side of (5.5) states the probability that jZˆ  is the preferred allocation 
within the subset A. 
 Let ϕ(z) be the probability density of the farmer’s chosen allocation in Ωˆ . That is, ( )dϕ z z  is 
the probability that the chosen allocation lies within ( ), d+z z z . 
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 Theorem 1 
 Suppose the choice setting of the farmer can be represented as described above and that IIA 
holds. Then 
(5.6) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
exp
exp d
Ω
τπ µ
ϕ
τπ µ
=
∫
z z
z
u u u
. 
 
 The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Dagsvik (1994), Section 4. 
 
 The empirical counterpart to ( )dϕ z z  is the fraction of farmers in the sample with chosen 
allocation within the interval ( ), d+z z z . The parameter τ is positive and 1 τ  represents the degree of 
dispersion of the error term ε(z). In our application it is reasonable to assume that the points { }kZˆ  are 
evenly distributed in Ω. This means that the distribution µ(z) is uniform. In this case (5.6) reduces to 
(5.7) 
( )
( )
exp ( )
( )
exp ( ) d
Ω
τπ
ϕ =
τπ∫
z
z
u u
. 
 The analysis carried out above is completely analogous in the case with more than two 
products. 
 Above we have treated the alternative allocations within Ωˆ  symmetrically. A possible 
extension would be to allow the error terms to have different correlation patterns in different subsets of 
Ω  as follows: 
 ( ) ( ){ }1 1 1 2 1 2 2A : 0 z c a, z 0 z 0, 0 z a c= < ≤ = ∪ = < ≤z  
 1 2
2 1 2
1 2
z z
A : a, z 0, z 0
c c
 
= + = > > 
 
z  
 1 2
3 1 2
1 2
z z
A : a, z 0, z 0
c c
 
= + < > > 
 
z  
A plausible hypothesis may be that the correlation between the error terms for alternatives within Ak is 
different from the corresponding correlation for alternatives within { }jA , j k, j,k 1,2,3≠ ∈ . This can be 
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accounted for by applying a nested logit formulation. We shall, however, not discuss this extension 
further in this paper. 
6. Estimation 
The theoretical model developed in Section 4 is deterministic in the sense that it is silent about 
individual unobserved heterogeneity and variations from one year to the next for each farmer. A 
conventional estimation strategy would for example be to specify how the distribution of water supply 
vary across farmers and to use the first order conditions to derive the estimation procedure. In general, 
this will be a rather cumbersome and complicated strategy. In contrast, the estimation procedure based 
on the random utility model of Section 5 leads to a relative simple estimation procedure. 
 We shall now discuss how the framework developed in Section 5 can be applied for 
estimating the unknown parameters. As above we consider the case with only two possible crops, but 
the general case is completely analogous. The unknown parameters are the parameters associated with 
the (subjective) distribution of the supply of water. As in the previous section we shall assume that the 
distribution of V/a is independent of the area a. However, more general regimes may easily be 
handled. In practice, data on the supply of water is usually not available. If so, one cannot, a priori, 
obtain estimates of b1j directly from observed quantities. We assume, however, that the farmer knows 
{ }jM  and { }jh . He uses the information about { }jM  to assess the rank ordering of the crops with 
respect to allocation of water. Note next that we can write 
(6.1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 2 2 21 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
11 11 12 12
M h M h z
z ,z m G z z m G z z G z m
b b b b
 
τπ = − + + − − 
 
 
where 
1 11
m b= τ  and 
2 12
m b= τ . Since b1j cancels in j 1jM b  and in j 1jh b  it follows that the right 
hand side is known to the researcher apart from m1 and m2 and the parameters of G (which are the 
parameters of F). The unknown parameters to be estimated are thus m1, m2 and the parameters of F. 
 In principle, it is now straight forward to apply the density (5.7) in a maximum likelihood 
estimation procedure. However, the computation of the denominator in (5.7) involves calculations of 
multiple integrals. Fortunately, this problem is easily dealt with. McFadden (1984) has demonstrated 
that one can consistently estimate the choice probability densities by replacing the “choice set” Ω by a 
finite and small subset of Ω which may vary across farmers. The points in this subset can for example 
be drawn randomly with equal probabilities. In addition, the chosen subset must contain the observed 
choice (for each farmer). This implies that the multiple integral in (5.7) is replaced by a simple finite 
sum with a relatively small number of terms. 
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 Ex post, when the crops have been sold, it may be possible to estimate τ because observed 
profit, πˆ , satisfies 
(6.2) ( )( ) ( )( )* * *1 21 1 2 2 1
11 12
M M
ˆE E m min Z ,V m min Z , V Z
b b +
 
π = + − 
 
 
where E denotes the empirical mean taken across the sample (or subsamples). When m1 and m2 have 
been estimated then one can estimate τ from (6.2). Subsequently, one can estimate b11 and b12 from the 
estimates of 
1
m τ  and 
2
m τ . 
7. Conclusion 
This paper discusses the modeling of multicrop agricultural production when the farmer is constrained 
with respect to land and is uncertain about his supply of water. We have assumed that the farmer is 
risk neutral and maximizes expected profit and that the production technology is Leontief with 
nonjointness production. From the model we have derived a characterization of the farmer's decision 
rule with respect to allocation of land to the respective crops. Since the crops require different 
irrigation supply per hectare, the uncertainty about water supply and the investment costs play an 
important role in the farmer’s allocation decision. For example, it is interesting to note that a risk 
neutral farmer may go from single to multi-crop allocation when uncertainty about water supply 
increases. 
 In this paper we have also considered a particular approach to bounded rationality in the 
sense that the farmer is allowed to make optimization error. This leads to a stochastic decision rule, 
which we have characterized. The motivation for the bounded rationality approach is that it seems 
more realistic than the perfect rational setting and it will also simplify empirical analysis and 
estimation. 
 Finally, we have discussed how the model can be estimated when micro-data are available. 
Specifically, we have demonstrated how the bounded rationality approach simplifies the estimation 
procedure drastically. 
 The modeling framework presented here seems convenient for analyzing effects of various 
agricultural policies on distribution of income and agricultural production. In particular it can be used 
to study and compare effects of various water reforms such as redistribution policies or water pricing. 
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Appendix 
The presence of seasonal specific crops 
So far we have ignored the fact that farm production is heavily influenced by variations in weather 
conditions. We shall now modify the framework above to account for the fact that some crops, such as 
sugar, needs two seasons of cultivation before it can be harvested, while other crops can be harvested 
after one season of cultivation. Typically, sugar needs a whole year of cultivation, but since during the 
monsoon period irrigation is normally not required
2
, we only assume a setting with two seasons. 
 Here we shall only consider the case where n 3=  and that “sugar” is the only crop that needs 
all seasons to ripen. Assume also that “sugar” is indexed as crop no. 3 and that ( )1 2 3min M ,M M> . 
This is not necessarily the case. Here it is understood that prices and production technology remains 
constant through the year. We assume furthermore that there are only two seasons, in which crop 1 is 
grown only in the first season and crop 2 is cultivated only in the second season. Thus 
(A.1) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3
2 2 2 3 3 1 2 1 2
z ,z ,z M Emin z ,V h z h z 2h z
M Emin z ,V M Emin 2z , V V z z
+
π = − − −
+ + + − −
 
where 
 j j 0 jz c x=  
and 
(A.2) 31
1 3
zz
a
c c
+ ≤  
must hold in the first season, while 
(A.3) 32
2 3
zz
a
c c
+ ≤  
must hold in the second season. Here Vj is the total amount of water available in season j, j 1,2= . We 
assume here that z1, z2 and z3 are all determined at the beginning of the year. Hence, in this setup, there 
are no possibilities for the farmer to adjust the allocation of land to the second crop in the second 
season. From (A.1) we get that 
                                                     
2 In the monsoon period the problem is one with too much water supply. 
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(A.4)
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 12 3 1 2 3 12 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 3z ,z ,z M G z M G z M G 2z z z M G z z h z h z 2h zπ = + + + + − + − − −  
where 
(A.5) 
z
j j
0
G (z) F (v)dv= ∫ , 
(A.6) 
z z
12 12 1 2
0 0
G (z) F (v)dv F (v)F (z v)dv= = −∫ ∫ , 
F12(v) is the c.d.f. of 1 2V V+  and Fj(v) is the c.d.f. of Vj, j 1,2= . 
 The corresponding first order conditions are given by 
(A.7) ( ) ( ) ( )( )* 11 1 1 3 12 3 1 2 12 1 2 1 1
1
M F z M F 2z z z F z z h
c
λ
+ + + − + = + −µ  
(A.8) ( ) ( ) ( )( )* 22 2 2 3 12 3 1 2 12 1 2 2 2
2
M F z M F 2z z z F z z h
c
λ
+ + + − + = + −µ  
and 
(A.9) ( ) 1 23 12 3 1 2 3 3
3
2M F 2z z z 2h
c
λ + λ
+ + = + −µ  
where λ1, λ2, µ1, µ2 and µ3 are the Lagrange multipliers; λj is positive when 
 
* *
j 3
j 3
z z
a ,
c c
+ =  
and zero otherwise, j 1,2= , and µk is positive when 
*
kz 0= , and zero otherwise, k 1,2,3= . 
 
 
 25
Recent publications in the series Discussion Papers
279 K. Nyborg and M. Rege (2000): The Evolution of 
Considerate Smoking Behavior 
280 M. Søberg (2000): Imperfect competition, sequential 
auctions, and emissions trading: An experimental 
evaluation 
281 L. Lindholt (2000): On Natural Resource Rent and the 
Wealth of a Nation. A Study Based on National 
Accounts in Norway 1930-95 
282 M. Rege (2000): Networking Strategy: Cooperate Today 
in Order to Meet a Cooperator Tomorrow 
283 P. Boug, Å. Cappelen and A.R. Swensen (2000): 
Expectations in Export Price Formation: Tests using 
Cointegrated VAR Models 
284 E. Fjærli and R. Aaberge (2000): Tax Reforms, Dividend 
Policy and Trends in Income Inequality: Empirical 
Evidence based on Norwegian Data 
285 L.-C. Zhang (2000): On dispersion preserving estimation 
of the mean of a binary variable from small areas 
286 F.R. Aune, T. Bye and T.A. Johnsen (2000): Gas power 
generation in Norway: Good or bad for the climate? 
Revised version 
287 A. Benedictow (2000): An Econometric Analysis of 
Exports of Metals: Product Differentiation and Limited 
Output Capacity 
288 A. Langørgen (2000): Revealed Standards for 
Distributing Public Home-Care on Clients 
289 T. Skjerpen and A.R. Swensen (2000): Testing for long-
run homogeneity in the Linear Almost Ideal Demand 
System. An application on Norwegian quarterly data for 
non-durables 
290 K.A. Brekke, S. Kverndokk and K. Nyborg (2000): An 
Economic Model of Moral Motivation 
291 A. Raknerud and R. Golombek: Exit Dynamics with 
Rational Expectations 
292 E. Biørn, K-G. Lindquist and  T. Skjerpen (2000): 
Heterogeneity in Returns to Scale: A Random 
Coefficient Analysis with Unbalanced Panel Data 
293 K-G. Lindquist and T. Skjerpen (2000): Explaining the 
change in skill structure of labour demand in Norwegian 
manufacturing 
294 K. R. Wangen and E. Biørn (2001): Individual Hetero-
geneity and Price Responses in Tobacco Consumption: A 
Two-Commodity Analysis of Unbalanced Panel Data 
295 A. Raknerud (2001): A State Space Approach for 
Estimating VAR Models for Panel Data with Latent 
Dynamic Components 
296 J.T. Lind (2001): Tout est au mieux dans ce meilleur des 
ménages possibles. The Pangloss critique of equivalence 
scales 
297 J.F. Bjørnstad and D.E. Sommervoll (2001): Modeling 
Binary Panel Data with Nonresponse 
298 Taran Fæhn and Erling Holmøy (2001): Trade 
Liberalisation and Effects on Pollutive Emissions and 
Waste. A General Equilibrium Assessment for Norway 
299 J.K. Dagsvik (2001): Compensated Variation in Random 
Utility Models 
300 K. Nyborg and M. Rege (2001): Does Public Policy 
Crowd Out Private Contributions to Public Goods? 
301 T. Hægeland (2001): Experience and Schooling: 
Substitutes or Complements 
302 T. Hægeland (2001): Changing Returns to Education 
Across Cohorts. Selection, School System or Skills 
Obsolescence? 
303 R. Bjørnstad: (2001): Learned Helplessness, Discouraged 
Workers, and Multiple Unemployment Equilibria in a 
Search Model 
304 K. G. Salvanes and S. E. Førre (2001): Job Creation, 
Heterogeneous Workers and Technical Change: Matched 
Worker/Plant Data Evidence from Norway 
305 E. R. Larsen (2001): Revealing Demand for Nature 
Experience Using Purchase Data of Equipment and 
Lodging 
306 B. Bye and T. Åvitsland (2001): The welfare effects of 
housing taxation in a distorted economy: A general 
equilibrium analysis 
307 R. Aaberge, U. Colombino and J.E. Roemer (2001): 
Equality of Opportunity versus Equality of Outcome in 
Analysing Optimal Income Taxation: Empirical 
Evidence based on Italian Data 
308 T. Kornstad (2001): Are Predicted Lifetime Consumption 
Profiles Robust with respect to Model Specifications? 
309 H. Hungnes (2001): Estimating and Restricting Growth 
Rates and Cointegration Means. With Applications to 
Consumption and Money Demand 
310 M. Rege and K. Telle (2001): An Experimental 
Investigation of Social Norms 
311 L.C. Zhang (2001): A method of weighting adjustment 
for survey data subject to nonignorable nonresponse 
312 K. R. Wangen and E. Biørn (2001): Prevalence and 
substitution effects in tobacco consumption. A discrete 
choice analysis of panel data 
313 G.H. Bjertnær (2001): Optimal Combinations of Income 
Tax and Subsidies for Education 
314 K. E. Rosendahl (2002): Cost-effective environmental 
policy: Implications of induced technological change 
315 T. Kornstad and T.O. Thoresen (2002): A Discrete 
Choice Model for Labor Supply and Child Care 
316 A. Bruvoll and K. Nyborg (2002): On the value of 
households' recycling efforts 
317 E. Biørn and T. Skjerpen (2002): Aggregation and 
Aggregation Biases in Production Functions: A Panel 
Data Analysis of Translog Models 
318 Ø. Døhl (2002): Energy Flexibility and Technological 
Progress with Multioutput Production. Application on 
Norwegian Pulp and Paper Industries 
319 R. Aaberge (2002): Characterization and Measurement 
of Duration Dependence in Hazard Rate Models 
320 T. J. Klette and A. Raknerud (2002): How and why do 
Firms differ? 
321 J. Aasness and E. Røed Larsen (2002): Distributional and 
Environmental Effects of Taxes on Transportation 
322 E. Røed Larsen (2002): The Political Economy of Global 
Warming: From Data to Decisions 
323 E. Røed Larsen (2002): Searching for Basic 
Consumption Patterns: Is the Engel Elasticity of Housing 
Unity? 
324 E. Røed Larsen (2002): Estimating Latent Total 
Consumption in a Household. 
 26
325 E. Røed Larsen (2002): Consumption Inequality in 
Norway in the 80s and 90s. 
326 H.C. Bjørnland and H. Hungnes (2002): Fundamental 
determinants of the long run real exchange rate:The case 
of Norway. 
327 M. Søberg (2002): A laboratory stress-test of bid, double 
and offer auctions. 
328 M. Søberg (2002): Voting rules and endogenous trading 
institutions: An experimental study. 
329 M. Søberg (2002): The Duhem-Quine thesis and 
experimental economics: A reinterpretation. 
330 A. Raknerud (2002): Identification, Estimation and 
Testing in Panel Data Models with Attrition: The Role of 
the Missing at Random Assumption 
331 M.W. Arneberg, J.K. Dagsvik and Z. Jia (2002): Labor 
Market Modeling Recognizing Latent Job Attributes and 
Opportunity Constraints. An Empirical Analysis of 
Labor Market Behavior of Eritrean Women 
332 M. Greaker (2002): Eco-labels, Production Related 
Externalities and Trade 
333 J. T. Lind (2002): Small continuous surveys and the 
Kalman filter 
334 B. Halvorsen and T. Willumsen (2002): Willingness to 
Pay for Dental Fear Treatment. Is Supplying Fear 
Treatment Social Beneficial? 
335 T. O. Thoresen (2002): Reduced Tax Progressivity in 
Norway in the Nineties. The Effect from Tax Changes 
336 M. Søberg (2002): Price formation in monopolistic 
markets with endogenous diffusion of trading 
information: An experimental approach 
337 A. Bruvoll og B.M. Larsen (2002): Greenhouse gas 
emissions in Norway. Do carbon taxes work? 
338 B. Halvorsen and R. Nesbakken (2002): A conflict of 
interests in electricity taxation? A micro econometric 
analysis of household behaviour 
339 R. Aaberge and A. Langørgen (2003): Measuring the 
Benefits from Public Services: The Effects of Local 
Government Spending on the Distribution of Income in 
Norway 
340 H. C. Bjørnland and H. Hungnes (2003): The importance 
of interest rates for forecasting the exchange rate 
341 A. Bruvoll, T.Fæhn and Birger Strøm (2003): 
Quantifying Central Hypotheses on Environmental 
Kuznets Curves for a Rich Economy: A Computable 
General Equilibrium Study 
342 E. Biørn, T. Skjerpen and K.R. Wangen (2003): 
Parametric Aggregation of Random Coefficient Cobb-
Douglas Production Functions: Evidence from 
Manufacturing Industries 
343 B. Bye, B. Strøm and T. Åvitsland (2003): Welfare 
effects of VAT reforms: A general equilibrium analysis 
344 J.K. Dagsvik and S. Strøm (2003): Analyzing Labor 
Supply Behavior with Latent Job Opportunity Sets and 
Institutional Choice Constraints 
345 A. Raknerud, T. Skjerpen and A. Rygh Swensen (2003): 
A linear demand system within a Seemingly Unrelated 
Time Series Equation framework 
346 B.M. Larsen and R.Nesbakken (2003): How to quantify 
household electricity end-use consumption 
347 B. Halvorsen, B. M. Larsen and R. Nesbakken (2003): 
Possibility for hedging from price increases in residential 
energy demand 
348 S. Johansen and A. R. Swensen (2003): More on Testing 
Exact Rational Expectations in Cointegrated Vector 
Autoregressive Models: Restricted Drift Terms 
349 B. Holtsmark (2003): The Kyoto Protocol without USA 
and Australia - with the Russian Federation as a strategic 
permit seller 
350 J. Larsson (2003): Testing the Multiproduct Hypothesis 
on Norwegian Aluminium Industry Plants 
351 T. Bye (2003): On the Price and Volume Effects from 
Green Certificates in the Energy Market 
352 E. Holmøy  (2003): Aggregate Industry Behaviour in a 
Monopolistic Competition Model with Heterogeneous 
Firms 
353 A. O. Ervik, E.Holmøy and T. Hægeland (2003): A 
Theory-Based Measure of the Output of the Education 
Sector 
354 E. Halvorsen (2003): A Cohort Analysis of Household 
Saving in Norway 
355 I. Aslaksen and T. Synnestvedt (2003): Corporate 
environmental protection under uncertainty 
356 S. Glomsrød and W. Taoyuan (2003): Coal cleaning: A 
viable strategy for reduced carbon emissions and 
improved environment in China? 
357 A. Bruvoll T. Bye, J. Larsson og K. Telle (2003): 
Technological changes in the pulp and paper industry 
and the role of uniform versus selective environmental 
policy. 
358 J.K. Dagsvik, S. Strøm and Z. Jia (2003): A Stochastic 
Model for the Utility of Income. 
359 M. Rege and K. Telle (2003): Indirect Social Sanctions 
from Monetarily Unaffected Strangers in a Public Good 
Game. 
360 R. Aaberge (2003): Mean-Spread-Preserving 
Transformation. 
361 E. Halvorsen (2003): Financial Deregulation and 
Household Saving. The Norwegian Experience Revisited 
362 E. Røed Larsen (2003): Are Rich Countries Immune to 
the Resource Curse? Evidence from Norway's 
Management of Its Oil Riches 
363 E. Røed Larsen and Dag Einar Sommervoll (2003): 
Rising Inequality of Housing? Evidence from Segmented 
Housing Price Indices 
364 R. Bjørnstad and T. Skjerpen (2003): Technology, Trade 
and Inequality 
365 A. Raknerud, D. Rønningen and T. Skjerpen (2003):  A 
method for improved capital measurement by combining 
accounts and firm investment data 
366 B.J. Holtsmark and K.H. Alfsen (2004): PPP-correction 
of the IPCC emission scenarios - does it matter? 
367 R. Aaberge, U. Colombino, E. Holmøy, B. Strøm and T. 
Wennemo (2004): Population ageing and fiscal 
sustainability: An integrated micro-macro analysis of 
required tax changes 
368 E. Røed Larsen (2004): Does the CPI Mirror 
Costs.of.Living? Engel’s Law Suggests Not in Norway 
369 T. Skjerpen (2004): The dynamic factor model revisited: 
the identification problem remains 
370 J.K. Dagsvik and A.L. Mathiassen (2004): Agricultural 
Production with Uncertain Water Supply 
